I am a neurologist and neuroscientist. I have worked since more than twenty years in the field of altered states of consciousness such as vegetative state, sleep and anesthesia, under the mentorship of Pr. Steven Laureys, Pierre Maquet, Adrian Owen, Marcello Massimini and Karl Friston. My research aims at combining neuroimaging techniques such as PET, functional MRI, TMS-EEG, and high-density EEG to a theoretical framework, the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness, hoping to uncover the neural mechanisms of the level and contents of consciousness in healthy subjects and neurological patients in order to improve both diagnosis and therapies. I am board certified in neurology in both Europe and the US.
My work has led to date to numerous publications in international peer-reviewed journals (~170 Pubmed-indexed articles, current Google Scholar H-index 81) and invited talks at international conferences (please see some videos in Talks tab). I am also currently Associate Editor of the journals Neuroimage, Frontiers in Consciousness Research, Frontiers in Brain Imaging Methods, Neuroscience of Consciousness and Brain Stimulation.
Please click here to see my Pubmed publications.
Please follow this link to visit the website of the University of Wisconsin Department of Neurology, where I work, and this link to the Integrated Information Theory website.
Featured publications:
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Christof Koch
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 26 May 2016
Abstract:
In this Opinion article, we discuss how integrated information theory accounts for several aspects of the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Integrated information theory starts from the essential properties of phenomenal experience, from which it derives the requirements for the physical substrate of consciousness. It argues that the physical substrate of consciousness must be a maximum of intrinsic cause–effect power and provides a means to determine, in principle, the quality and quantity of experience. The theory leads to some counterintuitive predictions and can be used to develop new tools for assessing consciousness in non-communicative patients.
Supplementary Information
Features a comprehensive description of axioms and postulates, an IIT pseudocode, some additional neurobiological predictions, and a comparison to other theories of consciousness.
Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness in the Front or in the Back of the Cerebral Cortex? Clinical and Neuroimaging Evidence
Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Bradley R. Postle, Christof Koch and Giulio Tononi
Abstract
The role of the frontal cortex in consciousness remains a matter of debate. In this Perspective, we will critically review the clinical and neuroimaging evidence for the involvement of the front versus the back of the cortex in specifying conscious contents and discuss promising research avenues.
The neural correlates of dreaming
Francesca Siclari, Benjamin Baird, Lampros Perogamvros, Giulio Bernardi, Joshua LaRocque, Brady Riedner B, Melanie Boly, Bradley R Postle B, Giulio Tononi
Nature Neuroscience, 10 April 2017
Abstract:
Consciousness never fades during waking. However, when awakened from sleep, we sometimes recall dreams and sometimes recall no experiences. Traditionally, dreaming has been identified with rapid eye-movement (REM) sleep, characterized by wake-like, globally 'activated', high-frequency electroencephalographic activity. However, dreaming also occurs in non-REM (NREM) sleep, characterized by prominent low-frequency activity. This challenges our understanding of the neural correlates of conscious experiences in sleep. Using high-density electroencephalography, we contrasted the presence and absence of dreaming in NREM and REM sleep. In both NREM and REM sleep, reports of dream experience were associated with local decreases in low-frequency activity in posterior cortical regions. High-frequency activity in these regions correlated with specific dream contents. Monitoring this posterior 'hot zone' in real time predicted whether an individual reported dreaming or the absence of dream experiences during NREM sleep, suggesting that it may constitute a core correlate of conscious experiences in sleep.
Image reproduced with permission from Gosseries O, Di H, Laureys S and Boly M, Annu Rev Neurosci. 37 (2014) 457-78.
My work has led to date to numerous publications in international peer-reviewed journals (~170 Pubmed-indexed articles, current Google Scholar H-index 81) and invited talks at international conferences (please see some videos in Talks tab). I am also currently Associate Editor of the journals Neuroimage, Frontiers in Consciousness Research, Frontiers in Brain Imaging Methods, Neuroscience of Consciousness and Brain Stimulation.
Please click here to see my Pubmed publications.
Please follow this link to visit the website of the University of Wisconsin Department of Neurology, where I work, and this link to the Integrated Information Theory website.
Featured publications:
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Christof Koch
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 26 May 2016
Abstract:
In this Opinion article, we discuss how integrated information theory accounts for several aspects of the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Integrated information theory starts from the essential properties of phenomenal experience, from which it derives the requirements for the physical substrate of consciousness. It argues that the physical substrate of consciousness must be a maximum of intrinsic cause–effect power and provides a means to determine, in principle, the quality and quantity of experience. The theory leads to some counterintuitive predictions and can be used to develop new tools for assessing consciousness in non-communicative patients.
Supplementary Information
Features a comprehensive description of axioms and postulates, an IIT pseudocode, some additional neurobiological predictions, and a comparison to other theories of consciousness.
Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness in the Front or in the Back of the Cerebral Cortex? Clinical and Neuroimaging Evidence
Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Bradley R. Postle, Christof Koch and Giulio Tononi
Abstract
The role of the frontal cortex in consciousness remains a matter of debate. In this Perspective, we will critically review the clinical and neuroimaging evidence for the involvement of the front versus the back of the cortex in specifying conscious contents and discuss promising research avenues.
The neural correlates of dreaming
Francesca Siclari, Benjamin Baird, Lampros Perogamvros, Giulio Bernardi, Joshua LaRocque, Brady Riedner B, Melanie Boly, Bradley R Postle B, Giulio Tononi
Nature Neuroscience, 10 April 2017
Abstract:
Consciousness never fades during waking. However, when awakened from sleep, we sometimes recall dreams and sometimes recall no experiences. Traditionally, dreaming has been identified with rapid eye-movement (REM) sleep, characterized by wake-like, globally 'activated', high-frequency electroencephalographic activity. However, dreaming also occurs in non-REM (NREM) sleep, characterized by prominent low-frequency activity. This challenges our understanding of the neural correlates of conscious experiences in sleep. Using high-density electroencephalography, we contrasted the presence and absence of dreaming in NREM and REM sleep. In both NREM and REM sleep, reports of dream experience were associated with local decreases in low-frequency activity in posterior cortical regions. High-frequency activity in these regions correlated with specific dream contents. Monitoring this posterior 'hot zone' in real time predicted whether an individual reported dreaming or the absence of dream experiences during NREM sleep, suggesting that it may constitute a core correlate of conscious experiences in sleep.
Image reproduced with permission from Gosseries O, Di H, Laureys S and Boly M, Annu Rev Neurosci. 37 (2014) 457-78.